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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the repayment performance of loans disbursed by a typical 
developing country specialized lender, the Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican 
Republic. It shows that loans in default are just one dimension of the repayment problems 
faced by specialized lenders and that rescheduling and payment with arrears should not be 
ignored. It also shows that, by following through time the status of loans disbursed in a 
particular period, the factors determining repayment performance may be better identified. 
It also shows how the results from the Multinomial Logit analysis can be used by the lenders 
for analyzing the various types of potential repayment problems that they encounter. 
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I. Introduction 
Specialized rural lending institutions (Sl..s), including public agricultural development 
banks, were created in the developing countries during earlier decades, with the purpose of 
supplying, either the longer-term credit that commercial banks were not prepared to offer, 
or loans to costly and risky clientele, such as small farmers, who were provided access to 
formal credit services, even in advanced of demand, for social and political reasons 
(Patrick). These SLs have received the largest share of their funds from governments and 
international donors and have granted targeted loans, usually at subsidized interest rates, 
to beneficiaries who have not always been creditworthy. An early concern with the 
performance of these SLs (Bourne and Graham) has been followed by increasing 
preoccupation with their lack of viability, reflected mostly by the decline in the real value 
of their loanable funds, as a consequence of inflation, poor loan collection, and operational 
losses (Gonzalez-Vega). 
The literature on rural financial markets has recently attempted to measure the 
magnitude and identify the determinants of the repayment problems faced by Sl..s. Indeed, 
a major cause of the financial difficulties of SLs has been the large proportion of non-
performing loans in their portfolios (World Bank). An estimated 30 to 95 percent of these 
portfolios have been in arrears in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America (Braverman 
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and Guasch). A number of analytical studies have attempted, in turn, to predict the 
probability of loan default by using Probit, Logit, or Discriminant Analysis (Luftburrow et 
al; Mortensen et al). 
Both analytical studies and officially reported information on loan delinquency have 
focused on the proportion of the total portfolio in arrears. This indicator is not adequate, 
however, for a meaningful analysis of repayment performance at the SLs. First, it fails to 
accurately measure performance, since rapidly-growing and long-term portfolios lead to an 
underestimation of the extent of existing and potential problems. Thus, the rising 
delinquency rates observed in many countries since the early 1980s may have reflected a 
slowdown in new lending (decreasing denominator) and the maturing of long-term loans 
granted earlier (increasing numerator), as well as potentially reduced incentives to repay, 
since the expectation of receiving future loans has declined. 
Second, while this index considers only the proportion of the portfolio in total or 
partial default at any point in time, the rescheduling of loans and loans paid after having 
been in arrears constitute important dimensions of the problem, as well. Because of their 
impact on the SL's liquidity management and operational losses, a meaningful analysis must 
examine these other dimensions of their repayment performance. Thus, to avoid distortions 
in the measurement of delinquency, as a result of different maturities and portfolio growth 
rates, the SL's performance must be monitored, by following through time the evolution of 
the repayment status of loans disbursed in each particular period. 
This paper illustrates these issues with an analysis of the repayment performance of 
the Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican Republic (BAGRICOLA). Since the 
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repayment difficulties experienced by BAGRICOIA are multidimensional, the paper 
attempts to predict these problems by estimating a multinomial logit model, using as ex-
planatory variables characteristics of the borrowers and of the loans, as well as regulatory 
instruments. 
II. The Multinomial Lo~it Model 
The statistical analysis of models with qualitative dependent variables can be viewed 
as the problem of predicting probabilities for the various possible values (responses) of the 
dependent variable. Probit and Logit are well-known techniques for the case when there 
are only two responses, typically the occurrence or non-occurrence of some event. For a 
case with more than two responses, Theil developed a Multinomial Logit Model that allows 
for both discrete and continuous right-hand side variables. The maximum likelihood 
estimation of this model is discussed by Maddala and by McFadden. 
For a comprehensive analysis of the repayment performance of loans disbursed by 
BAGRICOIA in 1987, special emphasis was placed on obtaining a primary data set from 
individual customer dossiers. The data refer to 2,204 loans disbursed in 1987 by 18 of 
BAGRICOIA's branches. The systematic random sample represented 6.0 percent of the 
total number of loans disbursed by selected branches during that year. The repayment 
status of these loans as of August 31, 1989 was classified into four categories: (1) without 
repayment problems, if the loans or installments of long-term loans were not yet due or had 
already been paid within 30 days of the due date; (2) rescheduled, if the period of the loans 
had been extended, without altering the amount of principal and interest outstanding; (3) 
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paid with arrears, for loans with completed maturity, when the loans or installments due had 
been paid but over 30 days after the due date; and (4) in default, if the loans or 
installments of long-term loans were still unpaid 30 days after their due date. 
The effects on the loans' repayment status of three groups of exogenous variables: 
(1) borrower features, (2) loan characteristics, and (3) regulatory variables is examined in 
this paper, in order to predict their impact on the SL's repayment performance. These 
variables are described in Table 1 of the annex. 
If Pj G = 1, ... ,4) are the probabilities associated with each one of the four repayment 
status, for estimation the multinomial logit model can be written as: 
lo~~), = fl1+ P1,JlORR,+ flplnAN1+ flpGUL,+ µft 
for j=2,3,4; and i= l, ... ,n 
(1) 
where P1 is the probability of loans without repayment problems, P2 of rescheduled loans, P3 
of loans paid with arrears, and P4 of loans in default, and n is the number of observations. 
The vectors of explanatory variables BORR, LOAN, and REGUL are sets of borrower 
features, loan characteristics, and regulatory variables, respectively. The f3 are parameters 
to estimate, and the µ error terms. Equations for alternative comparisons can be derived, 
as well. For instance, since: 
(2) 
we have: 
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log{;:), = (p .. -P31)+(p 42-P,.)BORR,+(P 43-P3,)LOAN1+(p ..,-P,.)REGUL, (3) 
Ill Estimation Results 
The estimated coefficients and their t-statistics are shown in Table 2 in the Annex. 
To facilitate the interpretation, Suit's dummy variable coefficient transformation was 
employed, by adding an appropriately chosen constant. In the first three columns, the 
results are normalized with respect to loans without repayment problems. A positive sign 
indicates, in general, that the probability of observing one repayment status (in the 
numerator) is greater than that of observing another (in the denominator). 
As expected, loans disbursed to agrarian reform beneficiaries with provisional titles 
(REFOR) are more likely to be in default than in any one of the other repayment cate-
gories. This may reflect more the characteristics of the credit lines available to these 
borrowers than the incidence of land tenure. Indeed, loans disbursed to non-agrarian re-
form occupants of public lands, without well-defined property rights (OCCUP), are more 
likely to be without repayment problems than in default. In the case of private landowners 
with established property rights (PRIV A), on the other hand, the difference between these 
two repayment status is not statistically significant. Instead, private owners are more likely 
to have paid their loans with arrears. These are counterintuitive results. One would have 
expected occupants without title to have a significantly poorer repayment performance than 
landowners. Property rights may not affect repayment performance, however, in view of the 
limited use by BAGRICOLA of mortgages as collateral (one percent of the loans), which 
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in turn reflects the high transaction costs of legal procedures and the lack of political 
feasibility for generalized foreclosing (Aguilera et al). 
Next, consider the effects of the credit evaluation (screening) operations carried out 
by the branch managers. As shown by the sign and statistical significance of these variables, 
loans disbursed to applicants rated as good risks are more likely to be without repayment 
problems than in default, while loans disbursed to applicants rated as bad risks are more 
likely to be in default than having paid with arrears or be without repayment problems. These 
results suggest that the credit evaluation operations carried out by the branch managers are 
successful. BAGRICOLA is able to separate good from bad risk applicants. If the lender 
is able to recognize bad risks, then why are loans to these borrowers disbursed? The 
regulatory framework imposed upon the lender's screening operations, either by the 
Government and/or international agencies, provides an important part of the explanation. 
Since different sources of funds impose different degrees of restrictions on the 
lender's creditworthiness evaluation, it is interesting to analyze repayment performance by 
the source of the funds. The results suggest that loans disbursed from less restrictive lines 
of credit, such as the SL's own funds and savings accounts (OWNR) and international non-
targeted funds (AIDF), are more likely to be without repaymef!ll problems than in any other 
of the categories, while loans disbursed from more restrictive lines are more likefy to 
present repayment problems. As suggested, loans from the ~arian reform lines (AGREF) 
are more likely to have been rescheduled, while loans from the SOCF funds are more likely 
to be in default than in any other repayment status. Loans from international targeted lines 
of credit (INTF) present the same probability of being in default than without repaymetfi 
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problems. This last result should be interpreted with caution, since 46 and 24 percent of the 
loans disbursed with World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank funds, respec-
tively, were not yet due by the end of August, 1989. Thus, the loan default potential of 
these international lines of credit is still high. 
Loans for investment in machinery and equipment (MACH) are more likely to be 
in default than having been paid with arrears than to be without problems. Loans to finance 
non-industrial food crop activities (such as rice) are more likely to have been rescheduled 
and to have been paid with arrears. Loans to finance industrial food crops and agricultural 
exports (INDF) are more likely to have been paid with arrears than to be without repayment 
problems or in default. These results indicate that loans for agricultural activities that 
require industrial processing or complex marketing get paid but are more likely to be paid 
with arrears. Agroindustrial processors, rice millers, and exporters typically pay the 
farm-borrowers for their produce only after processing or exporting it and frequent delays 
are reflected in farmer payments to BAGRICOLA with arrears. This suggests the need to 
revise amortization schedules and to explore the demand of credit for marketing activities. 
Larger borrower's assets make loans more likely to be wihtout repayment problems 
than in default, while larger loans are more likely to have been rescheduled than be in 
default. Finally, the signs and statistical significance obtained for the age variable indicate 
that older borrowers are more likely to be without repayment problems than having paid with 
arrears or be in default. If the borrower's age is a good proxy for the extent of the 
lender-customer relationship, this indicates that older borrowers have been able to establish 
a better relationship with the lender, as reflected by their repayment performance. 
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For effective portfolio management, Su require detailed information about the 
various types of potential repayment problems that they encounter. To illustrate the rich 
ways in which the results from the Multinomial Logit model can be used, the probabilities 
that loans disbursed in 1987 be in each of the four repayment categories as of end of 
August, 1989 were evaluated, at the sample means for asset size (DR$ 31,003), loan size 
(DR$ 4,043), and borrower's age (45.3 years}, for both good and bad borrowers investing in 
non-industrial food crops, for all permutations by source of the funds and land tenure type. 
The results, shown in Table 3 in the Annex, confirm the conclusions of the previous analysis. 
Agrarian reform beneficiaries, for example, have the highest probability of being delinquent, 
as compared to occupants of public lands without title and private owners, while the 
differences between these two are minimal. Loans from the less restrictive sources of funds 
are less likely to be in default than loans with funds from the more restrictive sources. 
Although the bank's own funds and deposits and the USAID non-targeted line of credit 
show a lower probability of loan default, they still present repayment problems, mainly in 
the form of payments with arrears. Finally, bad risk borrowers consistently present a poorer 
repayment performance than those rated as good risks during the screening process. Thus, 
the SL is successful in recognizing good from bad risks. 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the repayment performance of loans disbursed by a typical 
developing country SL: the Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican Republic. It 
shows that loans in default are just one dimension of the repayment problems faced by Su, 
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and that rescheduling and payment with arrears should not be ignored. It also shows that, 
by following through time the status of loans disbursed in a particular period, the main 
factors determining repayment performance may be better identified. 
The restrictions on screening operations imposed by the different sources of funds 
of the SLs were found to have a strong impact on repayment. That is, among borrowers of 
equal assets, loan size, and age, more restrictive lines of credit were strongly associated with 
a higher probability of repayment problems. It was also found that the SL is able to 
recognize bad from good risks. Thus, the repayment problems faced by specialized lending 
institutions in developing countries cannot be explained merely by the lender's and 
borrowers' behavior, but most particularly by the restrictions imposed on the SL's screening 
operations by governments and/ or international donors. 
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ANNEX 
Table 1: Variables Used in the Study 
Dependent Variable: 
DEF Polychotomus variable: 1 if the loan disbursed in 1987 did not present repayment problems by the end 
of August, 1989; 2 if it was rescheduled; 3 if it was paid with arrears; and 4 if it was in default. 
Independent Variable Sets: 
Land Tenure: 
PRIVA 
OCCUP 
REFOR 
Dummy = 1 if private owner. 
Dummy = 1 if occupant of public lands without title. 
Dummy = 1 if agrarian reform beneficiary with provisional title. 
Borrower Credit Rating: 
GOOD 
BAD 
Dummy = 1 if evaluated at least as a good risk. 
Dummy = 1 if evaluated as a bad risk or a new borrower. 
Use of the Funds: 
MACH 
NIND 
IND 
LIVE 
Dummy = 1 if machinery or equipment. 
Dummy = 1 if food crop production (e.g., rice, plaintain) 
Dummy = 1 if industrial food crop (e.g., tomatoes, melon) or agricultural exports (coffee, 
cacao). 
Dummy = 1 if livestock. 
Source of the Funds: 
OWNR 
AG REF 
INTF 
AIDF 
SOCF 
Dummy = 1 if bank's own or savings accounts funds. 
Dummy = 1 if agrarian reform or FIDE (Fondo de Inversion de Desa"o/lo Economico) funds. 
Dummy = 1 if international targeted funds (World Bank and Inter-American Development 
Bank). 
Dummy = 1 if international non-targeted funds (Agency for International Development). 
Dummy = 1 if Government or international social funds (IFAD). 
Independent Quantitative Variables: 
ASSET 
AGE 
LOAN 
Borrower's total assets in (000) Dominican Republic Pesos (DR$). 
Borrower's age. 
Loan Size in (000) Dominican Republic pesos (DR$). 
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Table 2: Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates 
Dependent Variable (Natural Logarithm of) 
Independ. 
Variable 
(P2/Pl) (P3/Pl) (P4/Pl) (P3/P2) (P4/P2) (P4/P3) 
1. OCCUP 
2. PRIVA 
3. REFOR 
4. GOOD 
5. BAD 
6. MACHI 
7. NINDF 
8. INDF 
9. LIVES 
10. OWNR 
11. AGREF 
12. INTF 
13. AIDF 
14. SOCF 
15. ASSET 
16. AGE 
17. LOAN 
18. CONST 
Coe ff Coe ff 
-0.244 -0.232 
(-1.6) (-0.8) 
0.111 0.498 
(0.7) (6.2)** 
0.127 -0.266 
(0.6) (-1.9)* 
-0.028 0.066 
(-0. 2) ( 0. 9) 
0.028 -0.066 
(0.2) (0.9) 
-0.567 -0.564 
(-0. 7) (-1. 7) * 
1.279 0.276 
(4.2)** (1.8)* 
0.359 0.332 
(0.9) (1.9)* 
-1.072 -0.044 
(-3.2)** (-0.3) 
-0.363 -0.406 
(-1.3) (-3.0)** 
1.139 o. 089 
(3.5)** (0.4) 
-1.545 -2.589 
(-2.4)** (-7.8)** 
-0.731 -0.475 
(-1.3) (-1.5) 
1. 500 -o. 684 
(5.3)** (-3.7)** 
-2.0E-6 -2.0E-7 
(-0. 7) (-0.3) 
-2.lE-3 -0.012 
(-0.3) (-2.7)** 
l.lE-5 8.9E-6 
(0.9) (1.0) 
-2.315 0.630 
(-2.2)** (2.0)** 
Coe ff 
-0.204 
(-2.4)** 
-0.072 
(-0.8) 
0.276 
(2.5)** 
-0.238 
(-3.4)** 
0.238 
(3.4)** 
0.262 
( l. l) 
0.176 
( l. 4) 
-0.319 
(-l. 2) 
-0.119 
(-0.5) 
-0.443 
(-3.5)** 
l.906 
( l.O) 
0.019 
(0.1) 
-0.904 
(-8.8)** 
1.138 
(7.1)** 
-2.lE-6 
(-2.6)** 
-0.012 
(-3.0)** 
l.OE-5 
( 1.1) 
0.178 
(2.4)** 
Coe ff 
0.012 
(0.1) 
0.381 
(2.3)** 
-0.393 
(-2.2)** 
0.094 
(0.6) 
-0.094 
(-0.6) 
0.003 
(0.1) 
-1.003 
(-1.7)* 
-0.027 
(-0.1) 
1.028 
(2.9)** 
-0.044 
(-0.4) 
-1.049 
(-3.0)** 
-1.044 
(-1. 5) 
0.257 
(0.4) 
-2.184 
(-7.4)** 
1.8E-6 
(0.6) 
-9.6E-3 
(-0.9) 
2.lE-6 
(0.1) 
2.945 
(3.0)** 
Coe ff Coe ff 
0.040 0.028 
(0.3) (0.29) 
-0.189 -0.570 
(-1.1) (-3.9)** 
0.633 0.542 
(-l.l) (-3.9)** 
-0.210 -0.304 
(-0.8) (-4.l)** 
0.210 0.304 
(0.8) (4.1)** 
0.828 0.826 
(l.l) (2.1)** 
-1.103 -0.010 
(-3.5)** (-0.1) 
-0.678 -0.654 
(-1.5) (-1.7)* 
0.953 -0.075 
(2.5)** (0.2) 
-0.080 -0.037 
(-0. 3) (-0. 2) 
-0.948 0.101 
(-2.9)** (0.4) 
1.564 2.608 
(2.4)** ( 7.6)** 
-0.173 -0.430 
(-0.3) (-1.1) 
-0.362 1.822 
(-1.3) (8.3)** 
-l.OE-6 -1.9E-6 
(-1.4) (-0.2) 
-9.5E-3 l.5E-4 
(-3.0)** (0.1) 
2. lE-5 1. 2E-6 
(2.2)** (1.5) 
2.492 -0.453 
(2.2)** (-0.9) 
l=without repayment problems, 2=rescheduled, 3=pald with arrears, 4=indefault. 
Figures in parentheses are the t-ratios of estimated coefficients to their 
standard errors computed from covariance of analytic first derivatives (Berndt 
et al). 
* significant at 10 percent level. 
** significant at 5 percent level. 
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Table 3. Probabilities of Being in Each Repayment Category, for Borrowers with 
Non-industrial Crops, by Source of Funds and Land Tenure. (Average Asset= 
DR$31,003; Average Loan = DR$4,043; Average Age = 45.3 years) 
Re~aYfilent Categories 
Source Land Without Paid with In 
of Funds Tenure Problems Rescheduled Arrears Default Total 
Good Borrowers: 
OCCUP 35.1 5.9 47.1 11.9 100.0 
OWNR PR IVA 28.0 12.1 49.1 10.8 100.0 
RE FOR 38.3 9.3 31.3 21.1 100.0 
OCCUP 21. 7 16.4 48.0 13.9 100.0 
AGREF PR IVA 15.3 29.6 44.0 11.1 100.0 
RE FOR 22.4 24.5 30.0 23.1 100.0 
OCCUP 57.4 2.9 8.7 30.9 100.0 
INTF PR IVA 51.4 6.8 10.1 31.6 100.0 
RE FOR 49.1 3.7 4.5 42.7 100.0 
OCCUP 38.7 4.5 48.6 8.3 100.0 
USA ID PR IVA 31.4 9.4 51.5 7.7 100.0 
RE FOR 43.9 7.4 33.5 15.2 100.0 
OCCUP 21.l 22.8 21.4 34.7 100.0 
SOCF PR IVA 14.3 39.8 19.0 26.9 100.0 
RE FOR 17.1 26.8 10.6 45.5 100.0 
Bad Borrowers: 
OCCUP 34.5 6.1 40.6 18.8 100.0 
OWNR PR IVA 27.7 12.6 42.5 17.2 100.0 
RE FOR 35.0 9.0 25.0 31.0 100.0 
OCCUP 21.0 16.7 40.6 21.6 100.0 
AGREF PR IVA 14.8 30.4 37.4 17.4 100.0 
RE FOR 20.0 23.1 23.5 33.3 100.0 
OCCUP 48.6 2.6 6.5 42.2 100.0 
INTF PR IVA 43.4 6.1 07.5 43.0 100.0 
RE FOR 39.0 3.1 03.2 54.7 100.0 
OCCUP 39.0 47.8 42.8 13.4 100.0 
USA ID PR IVA 39.0 04.8 42.8 13.4 100.0 
RE FOR 31.8 10.0 45.6 12.5 100.0 
OCCUP 17.6 20.1 15.7 46.6 100.0 
SOCF PR IVA 12.3 36.2 14.3 37.2 100.0 
RE FOR 13.4 22.1 07.2 57.3 100.0 
